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Abstract 
Regulatory policy in telecommunications must balance short-term efficiency (low prices) 
against the firms’ incentives to innovate, which have longer reaching impacts on 
economic welfare.  Historically, policy tended to sacrifice dynamic efficiency for the 
sake of competitive prices and static efficiency.  In the last few decades, economists and 
other researchers have begun to document the large welfare costs of ignoring dynamic 
efficiency.  We analyze the impact regulation has on innovation in a simple theoretical 
framework.  We then turn to the empirical evidence that regulation dampens firms’ 
incentive to innovate in the telecommunications industry in general and the market for 
broadband Internet access in particular.  Both product and process (cost reducing) 
innovation are discussed.  The chapter forms a compendium of available research on the 
intersection of telecommunications regulation and innovation.  The lesson for policy 
makers provided by the consensus of the literature is that lighter regulation spurs process 
and product innovation.  We conclude with a discussion of future regulatory trends. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For much of the 20
th
 century, regulatory policy directed toward the 
telecommunications market was concerned with ―getting the prices right‖.  Regulators 
took the set of existing firms and products as given and sought prices that maximized 
consumer surplus, subject to the constraint that the regulated firm cover its costs of 
providing the current set of services.  Although other regulatory objectives such as 
universal service played a role, regulation was framed within an essentially static view of 
the market.  In the latter part of the century, however, as the pace of technological change 
increased in the telecommunications industry, it became clear that regulation could hinder 
innovation.  In this chapter, we consider the evidence that regulation dampens firms’ 
incentive to innovate.  We begin by laying out the theoretical reasons underpinning this 
notion.  In the main section of the chapter, we review the empirical studies in the 
literature, focusing on the U.S. market.  In so doing, we find remarkably consistent 
evidence from numerous institutional and geographic settings that lighter forms of 
regulation encourage innovation. 
Before proceeding, we must ask what innovation is.  The term is used in the 
economics literature to refer to everything from basic invention to new product 
introduction to diffusion of existing technology.  We use the term in a broad sense to 
refer to the making available of something new in a given market.  It is useful, however, 
to distinguish between process and product innovation.  Process innovations are 
advancements in the methods of creating existing products, and may not be directly 
apparent to consumers.   Process innovation lowers the cost of producing goods or 
services currently available to consumers.  Product innovation is the creation (or 
 3 
diffusion to new markets, in our expansive definition) of new goods previously 
unavailable to consumers.   
Regulation affects firms in many ways.  Regulators historically deemed regulation 
justifiable, to reap the economies of scale and scope created by a single service provider 
and to further social goals such as universal service, while avoiding the inefficiency due 
to monopoly pricing.  Regulatory control over prices and profits was chosen instead of 
reliance on competition or antitrust policy, which is generally not designed to prevent 
market expansion by firms with legitimate cost advantages over rivals.  Competition law, 
at least in the U.S., furthermore does not outlaw the unilateral exercise of market power 
in setting prices.   
The economic inefficiency created by prices above their competitive level is 
illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the demand and marginal cost curves for a 
telecommunications service.  Total economic benefits from the service are the entire area 
between the demand and the marginal cost curves.  Benefits are maximized when 
quantity Q* is provided (as would happen if the competitive price P* is charged).  These 
social benefits, shared between the consumers and the firm, arise because one part of 
society (consumers) consumes units for which it is willing to pay more than it costs 
another part of society (the firm) to produce.  If a carrier with monopoly power charges a 
higher price, such as P
m
, then a lower quantity Q
m
 of the service is purchased and the 
market loses benefits in the amount of area DWL in Figure 1.  This deadweight loss, also 
known as the ―Harberger triangle‖, represents the dollar value of the economic benefits 
lost to consumers and the firm from units between Q
m
 and Q* that are not consumed at 
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the higher price.  Deadweight loss is a static loss in welfare, because it is calculated given 
the service is already available.   
The Harberger triangle is not the end of the story, because a regulatory regime 
that attempts to squeeze static inefficiency out of market prices may create dynamic 
inefficiency.  Dynamic efficiency stems from the additional net surplus created by new 
products and services.  In Figure 1, the surplus obtained by consumers each period from 
the existence of the service is triangle CS, sometimes called the ―Dupuit triangle‖.1  The 
firm gains producer surplus, the unshaded area PS.  If regulated prices are too low to 
encourage innovation, so that the product is never introduced, then consumers and 
producers miss both benefits (although the firm saves the cost of innovating).  Thus, as 
Bourreau and Doğan (2001) and many other authors point out, regulatory policy is a 
balancing act that often trades increased static efficiency for decreased dynamic 
efficiency.  The focus of this chapter, the dynamic costs of regulation, has received much 
less attention than have the static effects (Joskow and Rose, 1989). 
In the next section, we present a simple model to provide a framework for 
analyzing the impact regulation has on innovation.  We then turn to the empirical 
evidence on the interplay between regulation and innovation in the telecommunications 
industry in general, and the market for broadband Internet access in particular.  In these 
sections, we include every relevant formal econometric study pertaining to the U.S. case 
that we could find, as well as representative studies using data from other countries or 
                                                 
1
 Areas under the demand curve, such as the Harberger and Dupuit triangles, are only approximations of 
consumer welfare when there are income effects in demand.  However, as long as the income effects are 
not too strong, they are good approximations in many cases (Willig, 1976). 
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international comparisons.
2
  Thus, the meat of this chapter—and our main objective—is a 
compendium of the available research on how innovation depends on regulation in the 
telecommunications industry.
3
  We conclude with lessons the literature provides to policy 
makers and a discussion of future regulatory trends. 
HOW DOES REGULATION AFFECT INNOVATION? 
 
The likely impact of a market intervention can be analyzed by studying how the 
regulation changes firms’ incentives.  While some regulatory schemes such as price caps 
are known as ―incentive regulation‖ in particular, it is important to realize that any 
regulation, if it affects the actions of the market participants at all, does so by changing 
their incentives.  The economic study of regulation thus entails looking at how regulation 
changes the profit function of the firm.  When the profit function changes, the actions the 
firm takes to maximize profit also change.  Take the case of product innovation.  
Regulation can affect firm’s incentives to product innovate through three channels.  
There are direct effects through mandates, indirect effects stemming from changes in the 
cost of bringing a new product to market, and indirect effects stemming from changes in 
operating profits gained by new products.  Although we draw the examples in this section 
from the telecommunications industry, the model is generic and would apply as well to 
other industries. 
Most visible are the direct effects of regulation on innovation.  For example, a line 
of business restriction placed on the U.S. Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) after the 
                                                 
2
 Given the paucity of formally peer-reviewed, published research, we cast a wider net than is often seen in 
such literature reviews.  The reader is cautioned that some of the working papers and other unpublished 
studies we cite may not have undergone rigorous peer review.  This is particularly true of the section on the 
broadband market below. 
3
 We have undoubtedly missed some research, and welcome readers bringing omissions to the attention of 
the first author. 
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breakup of the AT&T Bell System in 1984 prevented the BOCs from manufacturing 
telecommunications equipment.  The incentive to introduce a new manufactured product, 
therefore, was dwarfed by the cost to the firm of the legal difficulties that would have 
ensued.  Other examples of direct impacts of regulation include social contracts between 
the regulator and the firm, which are often the outcome of a public utility commission’s 
review of a merger case or renewal of a regulatory regime.  In such contracts with the 
regulator, the firms often commit to putting new services on the market or making 
existing services available in more service areas.  The merger of Ameritech and SBC in 
1999 provides an example of the latter.  Ameritech, the incumbent local exchange carrier 
(ILEC) in five Middle Western states, had (in the eyes of the federal and state regulators) 
dragged its feet in making digital subscriber line (DSL) services available to customers.  
Before approving the merger, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) extracted 
commitments from the companies to promote advanced services such as broadband 
Internet access.  In particular, SBC was required to locate at least 10% of their advanced 
service facilities in low-income areas.  The requirement had teeth:  penalty payments of 
more than $2 billion were specified.  Subsequent to the merger, SBC deployed DSL more 
rapidly in the area (Hu and Prieger, 2008).  
In contrast to the obvious effect that direct regulatory prohibitions and 
deployment mandates have on product introduction, many (indeed, most) effects of 
regulatory policy are indirect.  To see how, we introduce a simple model of the firm’s 
decision problem.
4
  Consider the panoply of new goods that a regulated firm could 
                                                 
4
 For more sophisticated modeling of a regulated firm’s incentives to innovate, see Riordan (1992), Lyon 
and Huang (1995), and Prieger (2007,2008). 
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potentially offer.  Some would provide higher operating profit, others lower.
5
  Let the 
density m of operating profits R describe the distribution of potential outcomes, so that 



x
dRRmxM )()(  is the number of projects that earn more than x.  Assume in our 
simple model that the innovation cost c, which includes everything from basic research 
through development and product launch costs, is the same for all projects.  Then the 
amount of innovation in which the firm chooses to engage is M(c), for only projects to 
the right of c are profitable (see Figure 2).  We can now use this model to consider some 
indirect impacts of regulation on innovation. 
The first type of indirect regulatory effect is on the cost side.  Regulations that 
affect the cost of innovation c include mandated regulatory filings and hearings before a 
public utility commission before introducing a new service. Cost studies that a firm must 
perform before a state commission approves rates for a new service are an example of the 
indirect costs of regulation. Hearings and cases in the legal and regulatory arena  can also 
be expensive for the firm.  For example, before (and even after) the BOCs could 
introduce information services there was a drawn-out string of federal court cases 
revolving around the FCC’s Computer III series of orders, stretching from the late 1980’s 
(the California I decision) into the mid 1990s (when Computer III was remanded) 
(Prieger, 2002).  
Such regulatory costs increase c.  The effect on the amount of innovative activity 
in which the firm engages is clear:  as c shifts to the right in Figure 2, there are fewer 
worthwhile projects to pursue, M(c) decreases, and there is less product innovation.  
                                                 
5
 We treats costs and revenue as known quantities here.  If they are uncertain, there is no change needed in 
our discussion if the firm is risk neutral.  If the firm is risk averse, regulation has additional effects on the 
firm’s decision problem (see, e.g., Prieger, 2007). 
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However, it is important to note that if regulation induces only a small change in c, then 
there will be only a small effect on innovation.  It is only those products that were barely 
profitable that are lost because of regulatory costs.  How many such projects are not 
pursued depends on the density of projects in the vicinity of c.
6
  However, highly 
profitable projects (which are typically so because they provide sizable benefits to 
consumers) are pursued in either case.  Unless the additional costs created by regulation 
are large, or the mass of projects just to the right of c is large, the number of new 
products lost because of these cost effects of regulation may be minimal. 
The second type of indirect regulatory effect is on the benefit side.  Regulations 
that effectively increase the time to market of a new product reduce the present value of 
the project by delaying the accrual of service revenue.  Examples from telephone 
regulation abound.  Many states and the FCC traditionally required hearings or minimum 
approval delays of tariffs for new services, designed to protect consumers from the 
―deleterious consequences of innovation,‖ as one regulatory official put it (Oppenheim, 
1991).  The studies by Prieger (2001, 2002) cover examples from state and federal 
jurisdiction.   
Regulation can also limit revenue from a new product through other means.  One 
avenue is through competition.  Under the unbundling regime instituted by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the U.S., incumbent telecommunications carriers 
must unbundle and lease to rivals certain parts of their network.  The return on deploying 
the infrastructure is risky, and the carrier cannot fully recover the cost of investment after 
it is sunk.  Thus, unbundling creates an asymmetry between incumbents (which bear the 
                                                 
6
 In mathematical terms, the effect on the amount of innovation of a(n infinitesimally) small increase in c is 
M(c) = m(c). 
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risk) and competitors (which, because they can stop renting at any time, do not).  Renting 
unbundled network elements (UNEs) thus grants competitors a ―free option‖, and the 
extra competition reduces the return on the incumbent’s investment.7  Gayle and 
Weisman (2007) note that while unbundling may readily increase competition in 
telecommunications, it comes at the expense of investment that is vital for future 
innovation.   
Regulation can affect the competitive environment and the benefits a firm expects 
from introducing new products in other ways, as well.  Regulatory policy can encourage 
competition through means other than mandating resale and unbundling, such as by 
requiring interconnection between competing networks.  Regulation can also create legal 
monopoly (e.g., the Bell System in the U.S. until 1984), which enhances the incumbent’s 
ability to appropriate the social benefit created by innovation.  Monopolies, however, 
may cannibalize demand for one of their existing products by introducing a new one, 
which increases the opportunity cost of innovation (Arrow, 1962). 
Other features of the general regulatory regime a carrier operates under can 
reduce the benefits from innovation.   For example, ―prudency reviews‖ were a common 
feature of rate of return regulation (RORR), the most common form of utility regulation 
in the U.S. for much of the 20
th
 century (Kolbe and Tye, 1990).  If the regulator deemed a 
failed investment to be imprudent, it would be stricken from the rate base upon which the 
firm’s allowed rate of return was calculated, reducing the firm’s revenue.  RORR also 
attenuates incentives for process innovation, since excess returns gained thereby last only 
                                                 
7
 The term ―option‖ comes from the real options literature, in which the option value of delaying risky 
investment is priced into the firm decision problem (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  The adjective ―free‖ does 
not mean that the competitors bear no costs of entry using UNEs, but instead that they are not required to 
pay for the risk reduction that UNEs offer them.  See Hausman (2002) for the argument applied to DSL 
infrastructure. 
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until the next regulatory review (Cabral and Riordan, 1989).
8
  Alternative regulation, 
which includes price caps, earnings sharing plans, rate freezes, and other schemes may 
provide greater incentives for innovation.  We discuss alternative forms of regulation 
more in the next section.  For example, tariffs for new services require no cost studies or 
prior approval under the FCC’s price cap regulation.  Also, under price caps a dollar 
saved on cost (through process innovation) is retained by the firm, in contrast to RORR.  
However, even under alternative regulation the present value of the anticipated revenue 
from a new product is typically lessened, unless the regulation has no impact on the 
firm’s activity at all. 
Regardless of how regulation affects the costs and benefits of introducing new 
products, the net effect is shown in Figure 3.  As regulation increases costs from c0 to c1, 
the mass of innovation that becomes unprofitable is depicted by the horizontally striped 
area.  The vertically striped area is the mass of new products that become unprofitable 
due to the leftward shift of the revenue curve. It can be seen that changes in the revenue 
of potential services may have a larger effect on the amount of innovative activity of the 
firm than changes in cost.  Changes in cost affect only the marginally profitable services, 
whereas changes in revenue affect the mass of all formerly profitable services. 
In contrast to the usual view that regulation sacrifices dynamic efficiency on the 
altar of static efficiency, proponents of regulation sometimes claim that regulation 
encourages innovation.  In the context of our simple framework above, this could happen 
only if regulation lowered costs or increased revenue.  It is difficult but not impossible to 
imagine cases where regulation accomplishes such changes.  One oft-cited role for the 
                                                 
8
 Kahn, Tardiff, and Weisman (1999) argue, to the contrary, that RORR encourages innovation by reducing 
the risks involved, since the firm is guaranteed a specified return on R&D. 
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regulator is to set technological standards in markets such as mobile telephony where 
coordination among firms, perhaps due to network effects in demand, is important.  A 
standard imposed by the regulator that speeds consumer acceptance of a product can 
therefore increase revenue (or lower the cost of coordination).  However, for every 
example of successful regulatory standard setting (e.g., perhaps, the GSM standard for 
European mobile telephony), one can find examples of failure.  For example, the FCC’s 
delayed approval of a standard and spectrum allocation rules for mobile telephony for 
about 14 years during the nascence of the industry in the U.S.  Furthermore, industry-led 
efforts to coordinate are often successful absent regulatory intervention (e.g., the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) standards for Group 3 fax transmission).   
Regulatory rules affecting competition, similarly, can also have conflicting effects 
on the rate of innovation.  Increasing incentives for entrants to bring new services to 
market may diminish incentives for incumbents to do the same, and the net effect on 
innovation is ultimately an empirical matter in each market studied.  We take up the 
empirical evidence in the next section. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
 
Economic theory thus suggests that regulation may hamper innovation, at least by 
incumbents, but theory alone cannot accurately measure the impact in any given market.  
The numerous regulatory reforms in the U.S. telecommunications industry over the past 
few decades give researchers a unique opportunity to quantify the consequences of 
various types of regulation.  Compared to the vast number of papers related to the static 
effects of various regulatory schemes, there has been only limited effort directed toward 
quantifying the impact of regulation on innovation.  Joskow and Rose (1989) find this 
 12 
―distressing‖ given that the ―static gains and losses from regulation are probably small 
compared to the historical gains in welfare resulting from innovation and productivity 
growth.‖   
Nevertheless, some researchers have compared the amount of innovation under 
the traditional RORR and incentive regulation.  In the following section, we outline the 
empirical findings concerning the amount of innovation under divergent regulatory 
schemes.  We also examine attempts to quantify the effects of regulatory delay on 
innovation.  In addition, we review empirical findings on how unbundled network 
elements (UNEs) affect innovation.  Finally, we explore endeavors to measure the value 
of the loss to society from the postponement of product introductions due to regulation.  
Process and product innovation are covered in separate subsections, and a final 
subsection reviews the literature on the broadband Internet access market as an in-depth 
case study.  We summarize the literature for reference in Tables 1-3.  
Before delving into the empirical literature, it is important to point out several 
possible pitfalls for researcher.  Kridel et al. (1996) discuss the problems posed by 
demonstration effects, sequencing effects, and before-and-after study designs.  The 
demonstration effect pitfall occurs when regulated firms, in an attempt to encourage 
favorable regulatory reforms, artificially ―demonstrate‖ the success of these regulations.  
Thus, any positive action a firm takes after regulatory reform may not result from better 
incentives to innovate.  On the contrary, the actions of the firm may merely be a strategic 
(and temporary) decision to encourage permanent regulatory changes that are favorable 
to the firm.  If the demonstration effect is substantial, then the positive effects of 
incentive regulation that many researchers find may persist only in the short term.   
 13 
A related hazard is the sequencing pitfall, in which firms hold off investment or 
innovation until the anticipated introduction of more favorable regulations.  If the 
sequencing pitfall occurs, then innovations attributed to newly adopted regulations may 
also reflect only a short-term change in the firm’s behavior.  A third pitfall occurs with 
before-and-after empirical models (Sappington and Weisman, 1996), in which 
performance in a period before the new regulation is contrasted with a period after.  Since 
regulatory change is not conducted under conditions of a controlled experiment, such 
models can confuse the effects of regulation with trends in innovation that are exogenous 
to the regulatory reform.  With these potential pitfalls in mind, we can review the 
conclusions found in the empirical literature. 
Process Innovation 
 
Process innovation occurs when a firm, operating efficiently given its current 
technology, lowers its operating costs further by implementing new technology.  Hence, 
researchers, when examining process innovation, often focus on changes in a firm’s 
costs.
9
  Stimulating process innovation is often a goal of regulatory reform. For example, 
one of the intentions behind the transition from RORR to incentive regulation was to 
provide firms with better incentives to reduce costs and deploy digital infrastructure.   
The empirical literature on regulation’s impact of firms’ performance categorizes 
regulatory regimes differently, although generally a distinction is made between 
traditional RORR and alternatives.  Ai and Sappington (2002) provide a good example of 
regulatory classification.  They distinguish between RORR and three types of incentive 
                                                 
9
 Incentive regulation may reduce costs by means other than process innovation, however.  The famous 
Averch-Johnson effect, for example, maintains that a firm choosing its input mix under RORR will not 
minimize costs given the output produced and its current technology.  
 14 
regulations:  rate case moratoria, earnings sharing regulations, and price cap regulations.  
Earnings sharing regulations give the firms greater control over which rates and services 
to offer, but require firms to return to consumers a percentage of their earnings above 
certain thresholds.  Under most earnings sharing regulations, the firm is prohibited from 
increasing its earnings above a certain point.  Firms regulated by earnings sharing 
regulations will thus not have an incentive to lower costs beyond a certain level.  
Earnings sharing regulation is thus similar to RORR, in that both regulatory schemes 
focus on the profit being made by the firm rather than the prices of the services in 
question.  Rate case moratoria are typically an intermediate regulatory scheme in which 
regulated firms are freed from traditional RORR and given greater control over setting 
rates.  Under price cap regulation, there are no direct constraints on profit and the firm 
instead faces a limit on how high it can raise its prices.  Greenstein, McMaster, and 
Spiller (1995) note that firms under most price-cap regulations have greater control over 
prices than have firms regulated by traditional profit regulation like RORR. 
Kridel et al. (1996) review a variety of earlier papers related to incentive 
regulation and find mixed evidence concerning reductions in operating costs.
10
  Ai and 
Sappington (2002) perform a careful study and test empirically whether the introduction 
of incentive regulation did in fact lower the cost of producing existing services.  They 
observe that rate case moratoria do indeed lower production costs compared to RORR in 
their sample of ILECs in the period 1986-1999.  Surprisingly, other forms of incentive 
regulation do not produce significantly lower production costs than RORR, holding all 
else constant.  The authors suggest that this finding may be due to the regulated firms’ 
                                                 
10
 See also work by Resende (2000), who estimates a yearly ―efficiency score‖ (a measure of how 
productively a firm uses inputs) for U.S. ILECs.  He then regresses the scores on regulatory variables to 
find that alternative regulation is robustly and significantly correlated with better efficiency. 
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fear that lower production costs will cause regulators to ―ratchet‖ the standards for the 
firm’s performance upwards, thereby making any gains temporary.  When local 
competition is present, regulation does indeed reduce production costs relative to RORR.  
This finding supports the notion that incentive regulation should be complemented by 
increased competition to realize the theorized gains of incentive regulation.   
The deployment of digital infrastructure under various regulatory schemes is an 
important aspect of process innovation since it lowers the cost of providing services.  
Moreover, increases in digital infrastructure enable new services that require greater 
digital capacity.  Ai and Sappington (2002), Greenstein et al. (1995), Tardiff and Taylor 
(1993), and Taylor et al. (1992) find that incentive regulation leads to increased 
deployment of digital infrastructure, such as fiber optic cables and digital switches, when 
compared to RORR.  Greenstein et al. (1995) conclude that if all states had adopted some 
form of pricing regulation ILECs would have installed at least 75 percent more fiber optic 
cables than under the status quo.  They do not find, however, find evidence that earnings 
sharing would have produced results drastically dissimilar to those under RORR.  Ai and 
Sappington (2002), in contrast, find that deployment of digital infrastructure is more 
extensive under all types of incentive regulation—including earnings sharing—than 
under RORR.  Unlike the other studies, Ai and Sappington (2002) correct for the 
endogeneity of the regulatory regimes
11
 in their econometric modeling, and thus have the 
strongest claim to finding true causal effects of regulation.  They also find that the 
                                                 
11
 Endogeneity of an explanatory variable occurs when it is correlated with the econometric error term, 
which violates a fundamental assumption of ordinary least squares regression.  For example, if incentive 
regulation is more likely to be adopted in poorer performing areas, then incentive regulation may be 
correlated with worse outcomes in a regression, even though the true causal impact is in the other direction.  
Ai and Sappington (2002) discuss the issue thoroughly and provide a solution.  
 16 
amount of digital infrastructure added to a local area under earnings sharing regulation 
increases when local competition increases.  
To sum up the literature on process innovation:  incentive regulation appears to 
spur the deployment of next-generation infrastructure, and perhaps to lower operating 
costs.  The latter result does not always hold empirically, in contrast to the predictions 
from theory.  The divergence may be explained by the fact that regulators in practice are 
often not able to commit to adhering to the incentive regulation when the temptation to 
return excess profit to consumers arises.  If firms look forward to only short term gains 
from reducing costs, then their incentive to process innovate is blunted. 
Product Innovation 
 
Despite the limited amount of research on regulation and process innovation, until 
recently there has been more work looking at process innovation than at product 
innovation.  Given the difficulty of counting innovations not created due to regulation, 
the imbalance is not surprising.  Recent years have witnessed more attempts to quantify 
differences in product innovation under varying regulatory schemes, but the literature is 
still sparse.  In addition to the usual comparison between RORR and incentive regulation, 
questions of regulatory delay become especially important when examining product 
innovation.  Regulatory delay occurs when regulators prevent new products from entering 
the market until significant regulatory review has occurred.  Regulatory delay may 
enhance social welfare by ensuring that new products meet certain guidelines, but may 
also create a disincentive for firms to release new services.  
In an early attempt to study product innovation in the telecommunications 
industry, Mueller (1993) examined the effects of extreme deregulation.  In 1987, while 
 17 
other states were adopting earnings sharing or price-cap regulation, lawmakers in 
Nebraska opted to remove nearly all restrictions on the telecommunications industry.  
Firms were allowed to introduce new products and change rates with little regulatory 
oversight.  Of 100 new services offered by U.S. West that Mueller (1993) randomly 
selects for the study, 37 were first introduced in Nebraska.  The result of Nebraska’s 
experiment supports the contention that deregulation spurs firms to create new services.  
However, U.S. West likely opted to release new services in Nebraska first in order to 
demonstrate the benefits of such extreme deregulation.  This is an example of the 
demonstration effects pitfall (Kridel et al. 1996), and it likely explains a portion of the 
increase in new services in Nebraska.  Mueller’s findings may have limited validity in 
other settings, especially since no formal econometric model is used in measuring the 
impact of extreme deregulation. 
More recent attempts to quantify the amount of product innovation under various 
regulatory schemes have used more formal econometric models.  Regulators in Indiana 
replaced traditional RORR with a mixture of incentive regulation and deregulation.  
Firms were allowed to set prices and the long regulatory delays witnessed under RORR 
were significantly reduced.   Prieger (2001) estimates that the dominant ILEC 
(Ameritech) created new services 2 to 4.5 times faster than it did under the previous 
regime.  Moreover, Ameritech, would have introduced up to twelve times as many 
services had reform been enacted at the beginning of the observed period.  The author 
cautions, however, that the model consists of only two periods, one before introduction of 
the new regulations and one after introduction, with no ―control‖ state.  Thus the pitfall 
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cited by Sappington and Weisman (1995), in which trends in overall innovation rates are 
indistinguishable from the actual regulatory effects, cannot be avoided.   
Prieger (2004) confronts the problem posed by before-and-after study designs by 
using unique data covering three periods of regulation for information services offered by 
dominant ILECs.  The first and third period had extensive FCC regulation that created 
significant regulatory delay and forced firms to file extensive paper work before the 
approval of new services.  The second, interim period had lighter regulation.  The 
empirical evidence shows that firms introduced considerably more new services during 
the interim than during the first or third periods.  In fact, the model predicts that the rate 
of product innovation was anywhere from 60% to 99% higher during the interim. 
Furthermore, these new services reached consumers much quicker during the interim 
since firms did not face any significant regulatory delays.   
The author’s data and study design minimizes the potential for the before-and-
after problem, but the sequencing pitfall remains a possible problem.  If firms withheld 
innovations near the end of the first period in order to release them during the more 
profitable interim, then the significant increase in new services during the interim is not 
the result of better incentives to innovate under less regulation.  The author addresses the 
sequencing pitfall and ultimately concludes that it does not significantly affect the results. 
Prieger (2007) presents a theoretical model that predicts that a reduction in 
average regulatory delay would result in introduction of new services more quickly.  
These theoretical predictions are tested empirically by examining the number of new 
services offered in four states that adopted reforms designed to significantly reduce 
regulatory delay.   The evidence confirms that the theoretical prediction: shorter 
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regulatory delays lead to quicker product innovation.   Thus, Mueller (1993) and Prieger 
(2001,2004,2007) all consistently find that lighter regulation does indeed encourage 
greater product innovation. 
Increases in social welfare due to the creation of new products is an important 
aspect of the study of regulation and product innovation.  While it is unrealistic to expect 
a precise measurement of the gains and losses to society caused by telecommunications 
regulation,
12
 some attempts have been made to determine the welfare losses or gains from 
certain regulations.   
Hausman (1997) examines regulatory delay by the FCC in approving the 
widespread availability of cellular telephones.  He finds that the loss to consumer welfare 
in 1983 from regulatory delay was somewhere between $16.7 and $24.3 billion in 1983 
dollars.  Total losses were much higher, given that mobile telephony could have been 
introduced a decade earlier than it was in the U.S.  In similar fashion, Hausman (1997) 
estimates that regulation preventing AT&T (before divestiture) and the BOCs (after) 
from offering voice mail services cost consumers $1.2 billion per year.   
Prieger (2004), who examines the regulatory regime (CEI) put into place once the 
BOCs were allowed to offer information services, uses Hausman’s (1997) calculations to 
estimate the effect of regulatory delay on voice mail services.  The potential cost to 
consumers in delayed availability of voice mail services due to the CEI regime ranges 
from $690 to $910 million.  Prieger (2004) notes that voice mail is merely one of dozens 
of information services delayed by regulatory action.  However, Hausman’s figures for 
voice mail cannot be extrapolated to other services, because many of the others were 
much less subscribed than voice mail services.  Moreover, some of the services held up 
                                                 
12
 Nevertheless, see WEFA Group (1995) for a bold attempt. 
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by regulatory delay were substitutes for a service already available.  The introduction of 
such services would probably increase consumer surplus far less than would truly novel 
services.  We have not found other attempts to quantify the loss in consumer welfare 
caused by regulation. 
A Case Study of the Broadband Internet Access Market 
 
We turn now to one specific sector of the telecommunications industry:  the 
market for broadband Internet access.  The spread of Internet access—first narrowband, 
and now broadband—is one of the most studied phenomena in the literature on regulation 
of telecommunications.  As in the rest of the chapter, we focus mainly on the U.S., but 
also draw international studies into the discussion at times.  Growth in broadband Internet 
access (hereafter, ―broadband‖ for short) has been rapid in the U.S., especially compared 
to the spread of other recent services such as mobile telephony (Faulhaber, 2002).  The 
growing importance of broadband in the national economy is large but difficult to 
quantify.  The benefits of broadband that accrue to consumers are worth hundreds of 
billions of dollars per year in the U.S. (Crandall and Jackson, 2003).  Total benefits are 
even higher, since business’ profits are not included in the estimate.  Such rapid growth 
raises questions related to policy.  Did good regulatory policy in the U.S. encourage the 
spread of broadband?  Or, as some claim (e.g., Hausman, 2002), could broadband have 
diffused even faster in the U.S. (as it did in other countries such as Japan and Korea) if 
regulatory roadblocks had been removed?  In this section, we look at the evidence 
available. 
As in other segments of the telecommunications industry in the U.S., regulatory 
policy toward broadband is a welter of partly coordinated (at best) state and federal 
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efforts.
13
  State level direct subsidies for broadband are relatively rare:  one survey found 
that only three states targeted tax incentives toward broadband deployment in 2001 (Lee, 
2001).  However, not all states were included in the survey, and a later study found 15 
states with broadband tax incentives (Wallsten, 2005).  Wallsten (2005) estimates the 
impact of other state policies directed at broadband, including private-sector grants and 
loans targeted to deployment in underserved or rural areas and use of universal service 
mechanisms to stimulate investment.  None of these is positively correlated with the per 
capita broadband rate in the state,
14
 except for rural-targeted grants, and some even have 
negative correlation.   
Federal subsidies for carriers are not available for broadband specifically, 
although rural and high-cost areas receive general support for infrastructure, some of 
which may enable advanced services.  Federal demand-side subsidies include the ―e-rate‖ 
for schools and libraries.  Although billions have been spent on the subsidies, Flamm 
(2005) finds no measurable effect on broadband availability.  In sum, while it is not hard 
to find case studies of this or that neighborhood, organization, or school that benefited 
from being brought online by a subsidy program, there is scant evidence that the state and 
federal money spent has had large enough impacts to be measurable by econometric 
studies.  Some of the programs are relatively recent, however, and the conclusion may 
change as time elapses and more data become available.  
Lee (2001) reports that at least 14 public utility commissions hold rate hearings 
for broadband rates, but Wallsten (2005) states that nowhere do states set rates for 
broadband, a discrepancy not easily reconciled.  There is no federal rate regulation.  In 
                                                 
13
 This section draws on Prieger and Lee (2008). 
14
 Subscription rates reflect both innovation (in the sense of diffusion: where the service is available) and 
other factors, such as the usual supply and demand considerations for existing markets. 
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any event, we know of no study examining whether direct rate regulation of broadband 
affected its deployment by providers or take-up among consumers.   
The likeliest places to look for the impact of state policy on broadband are the 
general regulatory scheme for telecommunications and the prices it allows incumbents to 
charge competitors for access to the local network.  Both impacts occur through indirect 
channels.  As described above, RORR and price cap regulation lead to differing 
incentives to deploy new products—in this case, digital subscriber line (DSL).  While the 
cable companies’ decisions to offer broadband is not directly affected by public utility 
regulation in the U.S., any regulation affecting the deployment of DSL will indirectly 
affect the market for cable modem service, because they are substitutable to some degree.   
Prieger and Lee (2008) examine broadband deployment data for the entire U.S. 
and find that areas under RORR have a lower probability of broadband availability than 
areas under price caps or rate moratoria.  The impact of the form of regulation is not 
large, however.  After controlling for which firm is the local incumbent, the presence of 
competition, and a host of demographic and economic characteristics of the area, price 
caps and rate freezes are each associated with an increase in the probability of broadband 
deployment in the postal code area of about one percentage point.  Compare the increase 
with an average deployment of broadband in the ZIP code of 75% in 2000, the vintage of 
the data used.  Broadband services are often not subject to either price caps or rate freezes 
even when basic telecommunications services are.  So, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
evidence is consistent with rate of return regulation (in which revenue from all sources is 
typically regulated) dampening the incentive to deploy new services compared to 
alternative regulation.  The correlation found in Prieger and Lee (2008) may not be causal 
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for a host of the usual reasons, as they discuss.  Regulatory regimes are not randomly 
assigned, alternative regulation may be offered to companies in exchange for 
commitments to roll out advanced services, and companies favored with alternative 
regulation may wish to ―demonstrate‖ its beneficial effect to the regulator by speeding 
broadband deployment. 
The other way states may indirectly affect broadband is through policy toward 
UNE rates for the parts of the local network.  States do not set UNE rates unless 
negotiations between the private parties break down, but the threat of state rate setting 
affects the relative negotiating positions of the players.  Pindyck (2007) notes that 
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) have a significant advantage in bargaining. 
If the parties are unable to agree on a rate, then the state regulator will typically impose a 
relatively low price to ensure CLECs can effectively compete in the market.  The effect 
of UNE rates on broadband is indirect, because an ILEC’s DSL packet-switching 
facilities are not subject to unbundling. However, competitors wishing to offer DSL to 
subscribers without duplicating the local network could also purchase the ―last mile‖ 
segment between the incumbent’s wire center and the subscriber’s premises as a UNE.  
Since DSL does not require the whole line, until 2003 competitors could ―line share‖ 
with the incumbent by renting just the high-frequency part of the local loop as a UNE to 
offer DSL.  These various forms of unbundling enable competition in DSL.  Cable 
companies, in contrast, have never been required to open their networks to competitors.   
The empirical literature on the impact of unbundling on performance and 
competition is sizable, and here we cover only those empirical studies examining 
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broadband innovation.
15
  The impact of unbundling policies directed toward a subset of 
the industry may not be as important in general as competition itself between cable and 
telephone companies.  Howell (2002) and Maldoom, Marsden, Sidak, and Singer (2003) 
use sets of national case studies to find that unbundling is less successful than intermodal 
competition at speeding broadband deployment in developed nations.
16
   In another 
international comparison, Wallsten (2006) finds no relationship between full-loop 
unbundling requirements and broadband penetration, but that sub-loop unbundling is 
correlated with lower penetration.
17
   García-Murillo and Gabel (2003) likewise find no 
impact of unbundling requirements on broadband availability within a country or on the 
percentage of population with broadband access.  Relying solely on data from the U.S., 
Wallsten (2005) concludes that where more UNEs are rented, lower broadband 
penetration results.  Curiously, he finds the opposite correlation for lines that are resold 
instead of purchased as unbundled elements, which casts doubt upon a purely causal 
explanation for either result.
18
  The sole study we found that associates unbundling with 
increased broadband access is García-Murillo (2005), which uses a small international 
cross-section of countries.
19
 
                                                 
15
 Much of the literature on UNEs looks at whether unbundling leads to investment in infrastructure by 
incumbents and facilities-based entry by competitors.  See also Hausman and Sidak (2005), who discuss 
arguments for whether unbundling leads to more innovation.  They conclude unbundling did not lead to 
innovation in the five cases they study. 
16
 See also Distaso et al. (2006) for further evidence that intermodal competition is an important driver of 
broadband penetration. 
17
 In full loop unbundling, the entire ―last mile‖ of copper between the wire center and the subscriber is 
rented to the competitor.  Sub-loop unbundling entails renting access to only the last part of the ―last mile,‖ 
which in the case of DSL can allow superior transmission performance.  
18
 Federal regulations require that any service that the incumbent local exchange company offers to retail 
customers has to be offered to CLECs at wholesale prices.  These rules are distinct from the unbundling 
regime and UNE rates. 
19
 In the estimation where García-Murillo (2005) finds a statistically significant positive effect of 
unbundling on broadband usage, there are 12 variables in the regression nearly span the 18 observations, 
resulting in a near-perfect fit (R
2
 = 0.98).  In the other estimation finding a positive effect of unbundling, 
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Should we expect high or low UNE rates to stimulate broadband?  Hausman 
(2002) argues forcefully that allowing competitors to rent facilities after they are 
deployed by the incumbents causes the incumbents to invest less in infrastructure.  He 
attributes the early lead of cable modem service over DSL to the former’s closed 
networks.  In Hausman’s (2002) view, low UNE rates retard the spread of broadband, at 
least among incumbent carriers.  In accord with this notion, the rate of DSL subscription 
growth rose markedly after the FCC’s line-sharing rule was lifted in 2003 (Hazlett and 
Bazelon, 2005), although it is impossible to assess from a simple before-and-after 
comparison whether the change is entirely causal.   Burnstein and Aron (2003) use state 
broadband subscription rates to indicate that lower UNE rates discourage broadband, 
although their estimate is not statistically significant.  
 On the other hand, lower UNE rates encourage entry by competitors, thus 
spurring competition that may spill over to the broadband market as well (García-Murillo 
and Gabel, 2003; Ford and Spiwak, 2004).  Partially supporting this conclusion, Distaso 
et al. (2006), using data from Europe, and Prieger and Lee (2008), using U.S. data, find 
that areas with lower UNE rates are correlated with more broadband availability, but the 
sizes of the effects are small (although statistically significant).  The latter study has the 
largest sample size and number of control variables of any, and furthermore controls for 
any state-level variables that do not vary over time by the inclusion of fixed effects in the 
econometric model.  Further investigation reveals that the effects of UNE rates on 
broadband are greatest in states with alternative regulation.  Thus, although the evidence 
                                                                                                                                                 
this time on broadband availability in the country, the data used are the same as in García-Murillo and 
Gabel (2003), which found no effect when more controls are included in the regression. 
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in the literature is mixed, perhaps the tentative conclusion at this date is that UNE rates 
have little measurable impact on broadband deployment. 
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
 
For policymakers attempting to improve current regulatory schemes, the limited 
research available on innovation presents a problem.  Each regulatory setting is unique, 
and thus presents unique incentives to participating firms.  The external validity of the 
case studies is unknown, and not all instances of regulation have been thoroughly studied.  
What then can we conclude?  Fortunately, a consensus exists in the economic literature 
and some general lessons are clear.  In short, heavier regulation does place roadblocks on 
the information highway.   
Incentive regulation appears to spur process and product innovation.  Whether 
examining total deregulation (Mueller 1993), incentive regulation (Prieger 2001), or 
regulatory delay (Hausman, 1997; Prieger 2001, 2002, 2007), studies typically find a 
negative relationship between the number of roadblocks created by government 
regulation and the amount of product innovation.  While some studies may be picking up 
a demonstration effect in part, as long as the regulator periodically reviews the firms’ 
performance under the lighter regulatory regime and maintains the threat of re-instituting 
heavier-handed regulation (as was done in Indiana a few years past, for example), the 
improved innovation should continue.  However, the regulator must avoid the temptation 
to use periodic reviews to confiscate excess returns created by process innovation, for 
then dynamic efficiency is lost in the name of short-term, static welfare gains.  
Innovation and dynamic efficiency, however, are not the only goals of regulators.  
On the contrary, regulators are often instructed by legislation to strive toward competing 
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goals, such as efficiency and universal service, and must find a balance.  Rather than 
reading our review as necessarily calling for complete deregulation, policymakers should 
instead treat it as pointing out some of the dynamic costs of regulation of which they may 
not have been adequately aware.   
As regulators attempt to balance competing factors, however, they will find that 
the large potential costs from lost innovation often tip the scales in the direction of lighter 
regulation.  These costs are higher in times of rapid technological change, such as the 
industry now finds itself in.  The trend in telecommunications is toward convergence of 
voice, data, and video communication.  Regulatory schemes that discriminate between 
the types of information communicated (e.g., FCC distinctions between information and 
telephone services) or the mode of carriage (e.g., cable systems vs. the telephone network 
vs. the Internet) based on the arbitrary historical accretion of rules are sure to fail to 
promote dynamic efficiency to its greatest extent.  For example, when voice 
communication via VoIP (voice over Internet protocol) is carried over the cable system’s 
network on one end to the Internet and terminated on the telephone network on the other 
end, is it a telephone call?  Or is it just transmission of data?  A more appropriate 
question: why should it matter?  Rules that force regulators to split increasingly fine hairs 
to categorize services and providers are bound to hamper investment in new technology 
and services and to favor less efficient technology or carriers over more efficient in some 
cases.  
Banerjee et al. (2007) discuss principles for future regulation to be guided toward 
the goal of dynamic efficiency.  In the era of rapid technological change and 
convergence, good regulation consists of reversing the regulator’s past emphasis on static 
 28 
efficiency to the detriment of dynamic efficiency.  Instead of trying to force prices down 
to their long-run competitive levels immediately, or attempting to pick (and thus 
artificially creating) technological winners through asymmetric regulation, dynamically 
efficient regulation seeks to remove entry barriers wherever possible to allow unhindered 
intermodal competition.  As technology such as the Internet erodes the monopoly 
bottlenecks remaining in the telecommunications network, intermodal competition 
becomes ever more feasible.  However, removal of barriers need not be carried forward 
into creating ―negative entry barriers‖ by providing artificial advantages to intramodal 
competitors (as some claim the unbundling rules have done for wireline telephony in the 
U.S. [Hausman, 2002]).  Promoting inefficient entry at the expense of incumbents does 
not enhance dynamic efficiency and innovation.  The challenge for regulators in the 
future will be to ―do no harm‖ as they seek to level the playing field to let all participants 
compete, without imposing a priori notions of neutrality of outcomes that stifle 
innovation.  Without entry barriers in the market, dynamic efficiency will help solve the 
problem of static efficiency as competition moves prices toward their efficient level. 
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Table 1:  Empirical Literature on Process Innovation in Telecommunications 
 
 
Study 
Peer 
Reviewed 
Publication? 
Data and 
Period Major Findings Regarding Regulation and Innovation 
Ai and Sappington (2002) Yes U.S. ILECs 
1986-1999 
Examines deployment of digital switching and fiber optic cable, and operating cost, inter alia.  
Regulatory variables:  price cap regulation, earnings sharing regulation, and price freezes.  
General finding: ―We find that network modernization is more pronounced under … incentive 
regulation than under rate of return regulation.‖ (p.135). Specific findings:  price caps, rate 
freezes, and earnings sharing regulation are correlated with greater deployment of fiber optic 
cable.  Rate freezes and earnings sharing regulation are correlated with greater deployment of 
digital switches. Operating costs are lower under rate freezes that under RORR.  Costs are also 
lower under earnings sharing and price caps in states where local competition is relatively 
strong. 
Greenstein, McMaster, and 
Spiller (1995) 
Yes U.S. ILECs 
1986-1991 
(some 
estimations 
use fewer 
years) 
Examines deployment of fiber optic cable, ISDN, SS7 signaling, and digital switching. 
Regulatory variables:  price regulation, earnings sharing, and their interaction.  General 
finding:  ―We find that, in general, more liberal regulatory environments lead to great 
incentives to deploy modern equipment, and that LECs respond to these incentives‖ (p.189).  
Specific findings:  simulate that if states that had no incentive regulation had price cap 
regulation, those ILECs would have installed 77-127% more fiber optic cables than under the 
status quo.  Similar figures (albeit smaller but statistically significant) apply to ISDN and SS7, 
but no impact of incentive regulation is found for digital switching.  
Kridel, Sappington, and 
Weisman (1996) 
Yes various Reviews several studies from the early 1990’s on incentive regulation and operating costs.  
Results are various and mixed. 
Resende (2000) Yes U.S. ILECs 
1988-1994 
Examines the efficiency scores of LECs estimated by data envelopment analysis (DEA), 
measures of how productively firms use inputs.  Regulatory variables:  separate indicators for 
alternative (to RORR) regulation and price caps.  General finding:  the analysis ―concluded 
that alternative forms of regulation induce a higher level of productive efficiency as contrasted 
with traditional ROR‖ (pp.464-5).  An anomalous finding:  price caps are significantly 
associated with lower efficiency, which the author suggests is due to factors not directly related 
to the incentives provided by price cap plans. 
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Peer 
Reviewed 
Publication? 
Data and 
Period Major Findings Regarding Regulation and Innovation 
Tardiff and Taylor (1993) No U.S. ILECs 
1980-1994 
Examines deployment of digital switching, fiber transport, ISDN, and SS7 signaling.  
Regulatory variables:  state-level separate indicators for regulatory reform and incentive 
regulation.  General finding:  ―the rate of diffusion of new technology tends to be greater for 
companies that have experienced some type of regulatory reform‖ (p.45).  Specific findings:  
regulatory reform (an indicator variable for any type) is correlated with increased diffusion of 
digital switching.  Flexible pricing and banded ROR regulation have the positive significant 
impacts on digital switching, fiber transport, and SS7 (flexible pricing only) when the 
regulatory variable is disaggregated.  There are a few anomalous findings not discussed: 
deregulation is significantly negatively correlated with ISDN and price caps with digital 
switching and SS7. 
Taylor, Zarkadas, and Zona 
(1992) 
No U.S. ILECs 
1980-1991 
Method and variables are similar to Tardiff and Taylor (1993), which is (inter alia) an update 
of these findings.  Specific findings:  regulatory reform is significantly correlated with 
increased diffusion of digital switching, fiber transport, and SS7.   
Notes:  Although some of the studies examine many outcomes from regulation, we include only the effect on process innovation in our summaries here.  All 
quotations are from the study in column one.  Book chapters may be less stringently peer reviewed than are journal articles. 
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Table 2:  Empirical Literature on Product Innovation in Telecommunications 
 
Study 
Peer 
Reviewed 
Publication? Data and Period Major Findings Regarding Regulation and Innovation 
Hausman 
(1997) 
No* 18 US states 1991-
1994 (voice mail); 
 30 US MSAs  
1989-1993 (cellular 
phone service) 
General finding: ―this paper demonstrates that regulators should be quite careful in causing the delay of new 
telecommunications services because of the potential for quite large losses in consumer welfare.‖  Specific 
finding:  The lost consumer surplus from voice messaging service from the BOCs, prevented because of a 
line-of-business restriction, was $1.27 billion in 1994.  Regulatory delay in approving cellular telephone 
service cost consumers about $100 billion in lost benefits. 
Mueller 
(1993) 
No US WEST after 
deregulation in 
1987 
Compares performance of US WEST in Nebraska, where telecom was deregulated in 1987, to its operations 
in other states.  General finding: deregulation was ―successful at encouraging new service introductions by 
US West in Nebraska.‖  Specific findings:  of 100 randomly selected new service offerings by US WEST in 
its territory, 37% of the time Nebraska saw the first introduction.   
Prieger 
(2001) 
Yes Ameritech Indiana  
1991-1997 
Compares the number of new services introduced in the state tariff and the regulatory delay before and after 
alternative regulation imposed.  Regulatory variable:  an indicator variable for the period of alternative 
regulation.  General finding:  ―When the firm is released from RORR, the rate of service creation triples and 
expected approval delays nearly disappear.  The firm may have introduced up to 12 times as many services 
to consumers if the alternative regulation had been in place the entire time‖ (p.285). 
Prieger 
(2002) 
Yes Ameritech 
1984-1999 
Compares the number of new services introduced in the federal access tariff and the regulatory delay before 
and after price caps imposed.  Regulatory variable:  an indicator variable for the price cap period.  General 
finding:  ―More services were created under price caps than under RORR‖ (p.625).  Specific findings: after 
controlling for other factors, only high capacity services show a significant increase (301%) in innovation 
under price caps. 
Prieger 
(2004) 
Yes U.S. ILECs and 
AT&T  
1987-1997 
Examines the number of new information services introduced and the regulatory delay during three periods 
of the Comparably Efficient Interconnection regime.  Regulatory variable: an indicator variable for the 
periods at the start and the end of the time frame when the CEI rules were in effect, period of heavier 
regulation than the interim. General finding:  ―some otherwise profitable services are not financially viable 
under the CEI regime‖ (p.705).  Specific findings:  the number of services the firms created during the 
relatively unregulated interim is 60-99% larger than if the CEI regime had been in effect. Simulates that over 
the entire study period, firms would have introduced 62% more services if the regulation had not been in 
place compared to it being in effect the entire time.  
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Peer 
Reviewed 
Publication? Data and Period Major Findings Regarding Regulation and Innovation 
Prieger 
(2007) 
 
 
Yes Ameritech in 
Illinois, Indiana,  
Ohio, and 
Wisconsin 1991-
1997 
Examines the impact of regulatory delay on the time to introduction of a new service in the state tariffs.  
Regulatory variables:  average regulatory delay for new product approvals, regulatory uncertainty in time to 
approval, and indicator variables for implementation of alternative regulation in the state.  General finding:  
―the reduction in average regulatory delay in the Ameritech states contributed toward the speedier product 
introductions by the firm observed in the latter half of the 1990’s.‖  With the possible exception of Illinois, 
longer regulatory delay is significantly associated with a decrease in how fast Ameritech tries to introduce a 
new service. 
* The article is published with commentary by other academics, but the paper itself need not have been revised to reflect any criticism. 
Notes:  All quotations are from the study in column one.  Book chapters may be less stringently peer reviewed than are journal articles. 
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Table 3:  Empirical Literature on the Diffusion of Broadband Internet Access 
 
Study 
Peer 
Reviewed 
Publication? Data and Period Major Findings Regarding Regulation and Broadband Diffusion 
Burnstein and 
Aron (2003) 
Yes U.S. states 
Dec. 2000 
Dependent variable:  broadband subscribers.  Regulatory variable:  UNE prices.  Specific finding: UNE 
prices have no effect on broadband subscription. 
Distaso, Lupi, and 
Manenti (2006) 
Yes 14 European 
countries 
2000-2004 
Dependent variable:  broadband penetration rate (BPR).  Regulatory variables:  UNE prices, right of way 
delay, extent of competition.  General finding:  ―while inter-platform competition drives broadband 
adoption, competition in the market for DSL services does not play a significant role‖ (p.87).  Specific 
findings: the prices of local loop unbundling and leased lines are negatively associated with the BPR.  The 
impact of rights of way delay isn’t significant.  Intermodal (e.g. cable modem vs. DSL) competition is 
positively associated with BPR. 
Flamm (2005) No US ZIP codes 
2000-2003 
Dependent variable:  availability of at least one broadband subscriber in ZIP code.  Regulatory variables:  
eRates, rural health care grants, state indicator variables.  General findings:  the ―analysis shows that state 
policies may play an important role‖ (p.36).  Specific findings:  the conclusion about state policies comes 
from significant differences among state indicator variables, which reflect not just state policy but all non-
time-varying differences among states.  The eRate and rural health care grants have no impact on 
broadband availability.   
Ford and Spiwak 
(2004) 
No US states 
2002-2003 
Dependent variables:  percentage of ZIP codes in state that have at least 1 broadband provider; same with 
at least 4 providers.  Regulatory variable:  average UNE prices.  General finding:  ―the coefficient on loop 
price is consistently negative meaning that higher loop prices, holding costs and other factors constant, 
reduce both the universal and competitive availability of broadband services‖ (p.11). 
García-Murillo 
(2005) 
Yes 100 countries* 
2001 
Dependent variables: availability of broadband within country (AB), percent of Internet users subscribing 
to broadband (%IUB).  Regulatory variables:  unbundling requirements, broadband competition, 
privatization.  General finding:  ―Of the factors that governments can control, competition and unbundling 
show a positive relationship to the availability of the service‖ (p.102).  Broadband competition and 
unbundling are significantly positively associated with AB, but these results are from separate regressions.  
Broadband competition and unbundling are significantly positively associated with %IUB, although 
evidence is inconsistent for the latter.  Privatization has no effect on AB or %IUB.  Caution should be used 
when interpreting the results with the %IUB regression:  there are 12 variables included in the regression 
and only 18 observations. 
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García-Murillo 
and Gabel (2003) 
 
No 135 countries* 
2001 
Dependent variables: availability of broadband within country (AB), percent of population with broadband 
access (%PBA).  Regulatory variables:  unbundling requirements, telecom competition, privatization.  
Competition is weakly positively associated with AB, but unbundling and privatization have no effect.  
Privatization is significantly positively associated with %PBA. Unbundling and competition have no effect 
on %PBA. 
Hausman and 
Sidak (2005) 
Yes Five countries, 
various years 
Case studies of broadband uptake.  General finding:  the empirical case studies of ―the unbundling 
experience in United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Germany suggests that none 
of the four rationales [that telecommunications regulators offer for mandatory unbundling] are supported 
in practice.‖ 
Howell (2002) No OECD 
countries, 
various years 
Quantitative study but no regressions.  General findings:  the paper provides ―some empirical evidence 
from the OECD countries that the … local loop unbundling has had negligible effect in instigating the 
uptake of DSL services….Rather,…it is competition between technology platforms which is driving 
uptake of high-speed Internet access.‖ (p.25). 
Maldoom, 
Marsden, Sidak, 
and Singer (2003) 
No Seven countries, 
various years 
Case studies of competition in Germany, the Netherlands, Republic of Ireland, South Korea, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the U.S.  General finding:  ―the current policy framework leads to a situation where 
incentives to invest in infrastructure…are suboptimal…. [C]urrent policy could be reformed … to provide 
a coherent approach that provides appropriate incentives for investment, promotes facilities-based 
competition and better achieves the public interest.‖ (p.122). 
Prieger and Lee 
(2008) 
Yes US ZIP codes 
2000-2003 
Dependent variables:  availability of at least one broadband subscriber in ZIP code.  Regulatory variables:  
indicator variables for price caps, rate freezes, deregulation, and hybrid schemes, and UNE prices.  
General finding:  ―alternative regulation at the state level generally increases the probability of broadband 
availability, particularly for price caps.‖  Specific findings:  Alternative regulation is generally 
significantly associated with higher probability that broadband is available (PBA), with some exceptions 
in some specifications.  Excluding outliers, areas with lower UNE rates have a significantly (but small) 
higher PBA.  The effects of UNE rates on broadband are largest where there is alternative regulation. 
Wallsten (2005) No U.S. states 
2000-2004** 
Dependent variables:  number of broadband connections, share of rural population with broadband access.  
Regulatory variables:  indicator variables for state policy toward rights of way, municipal broadband, 
universal service, grant and loans, and tax incentives; telephone competition.  General findings:  ―the 
analysis reveals that most state-level policies are ineffective‖ (from abstract).  Specific findings:  
guaranteed access to right-of-way and resold local loops are significantly positively correlated with 
statewide broadband penetration (SBP).  Unbundling is significantly nagatively correlated with SBP.  No 
other state policies affect SBP, except possible state grants.  Regarding rural broadband access:  no state 
policies are effective; neither is the USDA broadband program.  The USDA rural telecom development 
program does stimulate rural broadband access.    
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Wallsten (2006) 
 
 
No 30 OECD 
countries 
1999-2003 
Dependent variables:  broadband subscribers per capita.  Regulatory variables:  indicator variables for 
various unbundling, collocation, and price regulation schemes.  General findings:  ―one general 
interpretation of these empirical results is that regulations that can reduce returns to investment (more 
extensive unbundling) or increase costs to entrants (allowing incumbents to insist on off-site collocation) 
reduce broadband investment‖ (p.17).  Specific findings:  subloop unbundling, virtual collocation, and 
regulatory approval for collocation charges are significantly negatively correlated with broadband 
penetration. Commingling collocation is significantly negatively correlated with broadband penetration. 
The effect of full local loop unbundling is inconclusive. 
 
Notes:  All quotations are from the study in column one.  Book chapters may be less stringently peer reviewed than are journal articles. 
* Actual number of countries varies across specifications and in some is quite small. 
** Vintage of data used in the regressions is not explicitly stated in the paper, but other references appear to identify this time period. 
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Figure 1:  Static versus Dynamic Efficiency 
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Figure 2:  The determination of the amount of innovation 
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Figure 3:  Changes in amount of innovation due to regulation 
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